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BOOK REVIEWS
By Sam D. Sieber. New York: Plenum Press, 1981.
Pp. ix, 234. $24.50.

FATAL REMEDIES.

Dr. Sieber attempts to explain why instances of collective or governmental intervention in social and economic problems frequently are
"fatal remedies." They create what he calls "regressive effects" whereby
the target group to be helped is actually hurt or the problem to be
solved is aggravated. To develop his thesis, he presents a series of brief
case studies describing interventions, their intended purpose, and the
final counterproductive results. He cites for example, attempts to increase agricultural production in Egypt by longer term irrigation of
farmlands after the building of the Aswan Dam. Snails carried a
debilitating parasitic disease, schistosomiasis, that multiplied exponentially in the new irrigation channels. Half of the population, rather than
the usual small portion, suffered from the energy draining disease, losing
their strength and vitality, causing sufficient manpower loss to reduce
agricultural production below former levels. Using a criminal justice related example, he describes the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration's practice of spraying the toxic herbicide paraquat on marijuana
plants to impede the production and use of the drug. The practice
posed a threat to public health as paraquat showed up in about twenty
percent of the marijuana smoked in the United States. Since the preservation of public health was the purpose of the controlled substance act
that banned marijuana, the use of paraquat was counterproductive, or
had a regressive effect.
The regressive outcomes of intervention are, according to Dr. Sieber, caused by an array of social and psychological processes that he
categorizes as functional disruption, exploitation, goal displacement,
provocation, classification, overcommitment, and placation, with each
category being subcategorized into component versions of each mechanism. Each category describes the mechanism by which the intervention became regressive. The functional disruption mechanism describes
how interventions interfere with the requirements of systemic equilibrium. Exploitation suggests that the intervention resources are misused
to the detriment of the target group. Goal displacement emphasises the
1306
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intervention process rather than the purpose of the intervention, causing
negative outcomes to be ignored, as in the case of paraquat and marijuana. Provocation, the intended or inadvertent use of fear or threat,
causes the target group to resist or develop counter-intervention efforts.
Classification creates artificial entitlement, exclusion of groups, or labeling of groups in a pejorative sense, causing harm to groups such as the
underprivileged, who are supposed to be helped. Overcommitment creates false promises followed by dissappointment and finally additional
demands by target groups. Placation creates a lulling effect, causing
vulnerability to the potentially harmful consequences of the problem
being considered, i.e., "the Maginot Line effect." Dr. Seiber concludes
with a discussion of the implications for policy development essentially a
set of guidelines that include the regressive outcome-causing mechanisms he has described. By including the sources of regressive effects in
the decision making process, the possibility of their occurrence can hopefully be minimized.
I found the case studies showing regressive effects fascinating.
While Dr. Sieber himself recognizes that many of the regressive mechanisms are commonly known, such as the temptation of the "forbidden
fruit," he provides additional insights into more subtle reversal effects
such as the unintended creation of implicit threats in an intervention
that can create a regressive reaction. For example, fear of the impact of
busing, which was intended to promote school desegregation, caused
enough white families to move to the suburbs to create school segregation. Intervention in the form of advice may create anxiety and force
target groups, smokers for example, to increase their psychological denial of the hazards of smoking. Intervention aimed at creating helpful
or often needed innovation in a system or organization can create a status threat to the target group, as innovation may suggest a change in the
hierarchical order in an organization. The status threat would, in effect,
create more rigidity in a system that appears to be in need of change.
The weakness throughout Dr. Sieber's work is the implicit assumption that the possibility of regressive outcomes are not considered or recognized by policy makers at political or organizational levels. In the
open political system, there are individuals or groups that can predict
counterproductive consequences of governmental intervention and technological innovation. In the development of policy at the executive or
legislative level or in the decision making process in organizations, dissent and argument is the rule rather than the exception. Certainly individuals or groups have predicted the regressive outcomes of the
interventions in the cases that Dr. Sieber uses in his work. An important
question that he does not address is why those individuals or groups
were not heard or taken seriously.
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The answer may be buried somewhere in our highly technological
culture, whose members perceive a history of technological advancements that have brought wealth and prosperity to a significant part of
the world's population. Society's confidence in technology, appropriate
or not, may have been improperly generalized to all social and political
institutions, placing those institutions under pressures to solve problems
and solve them quickly. While such a broad perspective is beyond what
Dr. Sieber is presenting, he should have focused some of his analysis on
areas pertinent to the compromises, resources sharing, and symbolic creations that are a normal part of our political process. Legislators and
public administrators indulge in an effort to respond to the demands
from a heterogeneous and often uninformed constituency.
Thus, political realities favor ignoring analysis and dissenters who
may predict regressive effects. Could we have denied the Egyptian
farmer water, knowing that the possibility of an increase in schistosomiosis may have existed? Probably not. Nor could a police administrator
advise the public, or at least parents of teenage children, that drug enforcement policies are counterproductive and should be abandoned.
The choice to intervene or not is often made by public pressure, and the
intervention is altered through the political process in spite of sound
technical advice.
Dr. Sieber's chapter on policy implications -is thus technically informative but his recommended actions seem to do no more than gloss
over the political framework in which policy decisions are made. Discussing the decisions of when and how to intervene in the political context from which they emanate would have added to his book.
Nevertheless it is a solid piece of work and well worth reading. It can
add to one's understanding of regressive effects-Fatal Remedies-and
how they might occur.
DAVID KALINICH
SCHOOL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
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THE INSANITY DEFENSE OF DANIEL

By Richard Moran. New York: The Free Press,
1981. Pp. xiii, 234. $14.95.

MCNAUGHTEN.

In January 1843, a Scotsman named Daniel McNaughten attempted to assassinate the Tory Prime Minister of England, Sir Robert
Peel. Instead he mistakenly killed the Prime Minister's private secretary, Edward Drummond. On March 4, 1843, McNaughten was acquitted of the charge of murder by reason of insanity when the Solicitor
General, following unanimous medical testimony as to McNaughten's
insanity, declined to pursue the prosecution further and Chief Justice
Tindal stopped the case. McNaughten was then sent to Bethlem Hospital (Bedlam) and later to the newly opened Broadmoor Hospital "to
await the Crown's pleasure." He died, still a confined man, twenty-two
years later, having refused consistently to comment on his attempt to
assassinate Peel. He was seen by all as a lunatic.
The major impact of McNaughten's crime was the use by the
House of Lords, two months after his trial, of a seldom used provision of
English Law which allowed them to require judges to answer legal questions concerning controversial cases. The verdict in the McNaughten
case outraged Queen Victoria and the Tories, and out of the inquiry in
the House of Lords came what eventually were called the McNaughten
Rules for the insanity defense.
Most commentaries on the McNaughten case have stopped at the
point of the House of Lords inquiry, but in Knowing Rightfrom Wrong
Richard Moran has taken the McNaughten case and set it in the historical perspective of the economic depression and political turmoil of England at the time. In the first six chapters of the book he makes a strong
although certainly not conclusive or compelling case for the proposition
that McNaughten was sane, that his "political delusions" of persecution
by the Tories were real, not imaginary, and that the crime was a political one, not one derived from the madness of an isolated man with
deviant ideas. McNaughten is seen as a middle level leader of the workingmen's movements of the day. Moran presents evidence to at least
make a prima facie case that McNaughten may have been a paid and
dedicated political assassin for one of these groups. The government, on
the other hand, is portrayed as handicapped in its prosecution of
McNaughten, since it would have had to expose its network of spies
among the working classes to rebut McNaughten's defense based on
"delusions" of persecution. Yet the government is seen as also benefiting
from the finding that McNaughten was insane because that verdict took
away any credibility that the assassin's ideas might have had at the
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time, although most of McNaughten's views were eventually accepted
years later by the House of Commons.
Moran's book is the best detailed description of the assassination of
Drummond, the strategies of the government and the defense during the
trial, and the climate of the times. Thus, it should provide excellent
background material for lawyers, political scientists, psychologists, and
psychiatrists who want more than a superficial understanding of the insanity defense. But more important, Moran places the insanity defense within the framework of its potential for abuse by government,
which, aided by psychologists and psychiatrists, can employ it to both
control and deprecate the actions of "political criminals." In that sense,
the book falls within the same tradition as the work of Thomas Szasz
regarding the role of psychiatrists and psychologists in cases where insanity is raised as a defense, but Moran is even more radical in his proposed solution.
In the final chapter of his book Moran advances the provocative
idea that our legal system is unable to deal with persons charged with
crimes which raise concerns about political and social justice as did the
violations of the Vietnam protesters a decade ago. Like the American
legal system of today, the British system did not allow McNaughten to
raise a defense of political or moral convictions. Moran argues strongly
that such a stance forces defendants into arguments as to their criminal
intent or into raising the insanity defense as a means of putting before a
jury the question of criminal responsibility.
As an alternative, he argues for incorporation of a political defense
into criminal law. Most lawyers, judges, political scientists, and mental
health personnel are unlikely to accept Moran's arguments and will
raise the same arguments against his position that Moran himself notes.
Yet this opening up of the argument for a political defense which would
be consistent with the values of a free society forces the reader to confront fundamental questions about dissent in a free society as well as the
techniques available in both democracies and totalitarian societies for
disparaging and minimizing dissent. In that sense, analysis of
McNaughten's insanity defense by Moran serves the same purpose that
analysis of the defense has long served in law schools: to analyze the
issue of criminal responsibility and justification for acts in great detail.
This book adds another dimension to that analysis. Few are likely to
agree with Moran, but his argument has a long legal history that has
been ignored for the past century. By adding this dimension to the discussion of criminal responsibility, and in particular by contrasting the
political defense analysis of criminal responsibility with traditional theories, the author has broadened the dimensions of legal analysis. As Moran points out, Chief Judge Bazelon of the United States Court of
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit accepted a similar stance in
dissenting in one of the Vietnam protest cases. Bazelon has consistently
argued that a jury is essentially the means by which to assess a criminal
defendant's "blameworthiness" or moral guilt and that without blameworthiness the imposition of criminal sanctions is invalid.
Bazelon does not explicitly go as far as Moran in his quest for wider
acceptance of analysis of moral guilt in our legal system, but readers of
this book will be forced to confront that issue. In particular, lawyers
exposed to the arguments presented come away seeing the insanity defense as more than a tactical maneuver in hopeless criminal trials.
RICHARD J. LAWLOR, J.D., PH.D.
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHIATRY
INDIANA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

By Floyd Feeney. Lexington,
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1982, Pp. xviii, 211,
$22.95.

THE POLICE AND PRETRIAL RELEASE.

In many cases, the formal arrest of a defendant may not be a prerequisite to judicial proceedings, particularly if the offense involves traffic, local codes, or property violations or other nonserious charges. An
individual can be served with an order directing and requiring appearance in court on a specified date and time to answer a specified charge.
Floyd Feeney presents a challenging and provocative integrated
model for use in establishing and managing pretrial release procedures.
He offers a detailed history of the movement toward the use of citations
and makes a rational argument that the primary purpose of our arrest
procedures is to bring the offender before a judicial officer but to do it in
a way which will reduce expense to the taxpayer, free police manpower
for other primary duties, safeguard the defendant's rights, and ultimately add to the dignity of the law enforcement process. Thus, society
can reduce the unnecessary detention of misdemeanants at the risk of
only minor increases in nonappearance rates. In addition, a major portion of the book resembles a how-to-do-it manual for the initiation, implementation, management, and evaluation of police-citation programs.
The book refers to a "summons" as a "citation," demonstrating
that the terminology actually used around the country to describe the
procedure is often confusing. Despite the name used by the various jurisdictions, however, the practice deserves serious consideration in en-
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compassing a wide range of criminal offenses previously given little
attention.
The bail reform movement in this country burgeoned during the
1960's, with the major focus on securing the release on their own recognizance of persons arrested for felonies. Misdemeanor cases received less
attention in the bail reform movement. The Manhattan Bail Project
was a leading national effort directed at reducing pretrial detention.
In 1964 the Manhattan Summons Project attempted to utilize
more broadly the summons process in lieu of formal arrest and detention. During the same year at the National Conference on Bail and
Criminal Justice, Michael J. Murphy, Police Commissioner of New
York City, stated in an address that "the procedure of extended use of
summons in lieu of arrest may help remove one of the most marked
inequities 'of our judicial system-the deprivations of freedom because of
inability to raise bail." Thus, he recommended that the summons be
used in preference to arrest, if feasible, and that release on one's own
recognizance be the norm in preference to bail, unless there is reason to
believe that non-appearance is probable.
Gradually, police began to use citations and releases in the field for
selected misdemeanor cases. Traffic cases, in which citations are used,
still overshadow other uses for the procedure. Floyd Feeney presents a
number of studies along with his own primary research to suggest the
increased use of police citations. He also reports, however, that major
attention has not been focused on this aspect of bail reform.
He discusses examples to provide some idea of how the citation procedure has been implemented in a number of different communities.
Five different locales were scrutinized: Oakland, California, a city of
340,000 with a substantial minority population; New Haven, Connecticut, a city of 125,000 with a considerable minority population and a
large university near its core area; the District of Columbia, the nation's
capital, with a population of 600,000 and a major crime problem; Jacksonville, Florida, a unified city/county government, with a population
of 540,000; and Minneapolis, Minnesota, which has a population of
370,000 and is the largest city in that state.
The author wisely selects his case examples and it is fair to say that
the survey represents a cross section of law enforcement agencies and
pretrial release procedures. He emphasizes that what works in one
agency or community may be wholly inappropriate for another. The
only criticism of an otherwise insightful survey is that the data generated in the case examples do not convey a relationship among the contrasting variables of each sample. A brief summary of the major trends
of how citations are used by the different communities at the end of the
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discussion would have clarified the overall rate of and the problems of
citation use, and the police organizational procedures employed in pretrial release.
For practitioners and acamedicians who have labored to produce
change from within, or have lobbied from without, for wider use of the
citation in lieu of arrest to benefit the powerless and poor, as well as for
others who support pretrial release as a means of reducing the expense
to the taxpayer, the message seems to be clear. Floyd Feeney has created a viable and flexible prescription for establishing and managing
police release procedures. In these times of fiscal constraints, a program
that reduces both the human and the financial costs of our criminal
justice system should generate momentum for a national effort toward
expanding the use of police citations. If this effort is ultimately successful, society can anticipate considerable savings in detention and welfare
costs. The present high cost of custodial care and the current overcrowding of jails indicate the urgent need for measures of this magnitude. There will also be savings in policeman hours. The probability of
reducing the time and administrative work involved in an arrest means
that the procedure will keep policemen on patrol, where they belong.
A procedure of pretrial release will, moreover, improve the relationship between the police and community. Consideration given to the accused with respect to human rights, comfort, welfare, and dignity, is a
practical and true manifestation of the assumption that a person is innocent until proven guilty. Poor persons, who are unable to afford bail,
are spared the shame of what may be an unnecessary arrest and incarceration. Thus, the defendant may be accorded the privilege of citation
without regard to economic status.
In general, this book is an impressive and thoughtful work that fits
well into the ongoing bail reform movement in the United States. It
raises meaningful questions and provides a provocative model for the
implementation of a pretrial release procedure. Professor Feeney's efforts advance an area in bail reform that has been undervalued in present law enforcement practices.
QUINTEN G. GRESHAM, A.C.S.W.
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WORK
THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA IN BIRMINGHAM
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COMPARATIVE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES. By Ira P. Robbins. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1980. Pp. x, 105.
$14.95.
As Ira P. Robbins states in the preface to Comparative Posiconviction
Remedies, the avenues for challenge open to a convicted person represent
an indication of the value which society places on individual liberty.
The subject of this book is, therefore, a highly significant one in a world
in which concern for human rights is a volatile issue. Since the matter of
remedies cannot be evaluated in isolation, Robbins has taken on a formidable project in making a comparative analysis of the systems of several nations.
With free legal assistance becoming more prevalent in American
courts, enhancing the availability of appeal opportunities, it becomes
ever more important to consider the balance between the need for providing individuals with fair appeal procedures and society's interest that
there be finality in adjudication. In Comparative Posiconviction Remedies,
Robbins examines the conflict between these goals in several countries
in order to yield "some comparative insights on the issue of the proper
point of repose in the criminal process." In addition, he refers to other
benefits to be derived from transnational studies. As foreign travel burgeons, it is pertinent for larger numbers of potential travellers to be able
to comprehend the legal systems in which they find themselves, "to
know of and understand the criminal charges and procedures to which
they might be subjected."
Initially, Robbins sketches the history of postconviction relief in the
United States, describing its expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. He then notes that some of the more recent Supreme Court
decisions have restricted the right of appeal and collateral remedies and
suggests that the Court "may be waxing in favor of even greater finality
of criminal convictions." Against this background, the author proceeds
to outline postconviction remedies in five specific countries: Mexico,
Brazil, Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the People's
Republic of China. The list appears to be eclectic, not clearly chosen
according to an evident logical criterion such as representative regions of
the world or families of law. Robbins' explanation is that the nations
were "selected with an eye to their diversity of ideas, perspectives, and
interesting postconviction features."
Some of the chapters focus on procedures of a particular country.
The organization of these chapters differs; comparison would have been
easier for the reader if Robbins had utilized a uniform sequence of topics in reference to each of the countries. A similar organizational problem is evident in sections where Robbins describes the postconviction

1982]

BOOK REVIEWS

1315

remedy prior to explaining the jurisdictional categories and levels of
courts in the polity under discussion, an approach which makes it difficult for the reader to comprehend the route of appeal.
It is, of course, a particularly difficult task to compare systems at
the same time that one must explain them. At some points Robbins first
explicates the foreign remedy and then correlates it to American practice; at others he compares the two as he goes along. Also, the amount of
comparison varies greatly from chapter to chapter; for nations like Brazil and Yugoslavia there is very little, whereas his review of the court
processes in the Federal Republic of Germany includes references to
those of other countries as well.
One chapter takes a transnational approach regarding the position
and function of federal constitutional courts. Robbins notes that Austria created a separate court for the function of judicial review in 1920
and then compares the character of current constitutional courts in Germany, Italy, and Austria. The existence of this type of court, which is
"somewhat extrinsic to the ordinary judicial system," has the effect of
undermining the finality of the judicial system. In his final chapter,
Robbins turns to an examination of international efforts to protect
human rights. Again he starts with an historical perspective and moves
to a depiction of current attempts. An intriguing proposal which he
mentions is that of Luis Kutner who contemplates a system of regional
circuit courts of "world habeas corpus."
The comparativist must be constantly alert to the danger of assuming that principles and procedures expressed in constitutions and codes
correspond to actual policy and practice. Robbins states that written
protections "are no guarantee of human rights; there we are compelled
to look behind the words of these guarantees to see how they actually
function." Occasionally it is, paradoxically, the most liberal nations
which are the quickest to suspend personal liberties or to violate other
human rights.
Another caveat which one must bear in mind is that ethnocentrism
may cloud perception of the conceptual context of particular legal procedures; what may appear repressive to American eyes may, in fact, be a
principle which is indicative of a liberalizing trend in a hitherto statist
policy. Robbins finds the Chinese system to be so different from that of
the United States as almost to defy comparison, adding that in view of
the Chinese tradition, their system may not appear as harsh to the Chinese as it does to Americans.
Perhaps it is unfair to criticize the book because of its brevity; it
simply would be unrealistic to ask one author to write at length about
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such diverse polities. Still, the scant number of pages serves more to
whet curiosity than to satisfy it, and the brevity can cause confusion.
For example, in the chapter concerning postconviction remedies in
Mexico, Robbins defines amparo, a suit which can challenge both the
constitution or a law as well as the action of an official, without directly
comparing it to the United States doctrine of .due process or to section
1983 cases. More disturbing, the skeletal description of a country's process can be misleading. In the discussion of German courts, Robbins
writes that "trials for all but the most serious crimes take place in a
mixed tribunal which consists of two lay judges and a professional
judge." He fails, however, to indicate that there is also a chamber presided over by a single professional judge which has jurisdiction over
petty crimes and that the line of appeal differs for this court.
Readers may wish that Robbins had expanded his treatment of
some doctrines and procedures which vary widely from those of the
United States. In some countries the state may appeal an acquittal. Inasmuch as there are proposals now being made for this principle to be
written into our federal criminal code, greater detail on the actual effect
of this practice might be relevant. Another concept mentioned in passing is the jurisprudentia of Mexican law, under which five consecutive
amparo decisions by the Supreme Court holding the same way on the
same issue become binding on lower courts even though the law at issu&
does not thereby become invalid. The author could have analyzedjurirprudentia more fully in relation to our doctrine of stare decisis.
For professors who teach courses in comparative judicial systems,
Comparative Postconviction Remedies will be a welcome volume, and the
bibliographical notes should prove to be of immense value for researchers. Many of the notes refer to sources in English, an especially valuable
aid in the field of comparative study. Unfortunately, however, there is
not always an indication of an English translation for the constitutions
or codes. Robbins seems to be addressing readers who have at least
some legal understanding. He uses terms which might be unfamiliar
without defining them, a problem which might be solved by inclusion of
a glossary. There is a possibility that this book may prove to be either
too esoteric for the general reader or too lacking in detail for the specialist. Robbins considers ComparativePostconvictionRemedies to be an exploratory study, and it should effectively serve to foster more extensive
investigation along the lines which he has sketched. In the interim, the
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book surely represents a substantial contribution to comparative
literature.
NANCY TRAVIS WOLFE

COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA

COPING WITH CRIME:

INDIVIDUAL AND NEIGHBORHOOD REACTIONS.

By Wesley G Skogan and Michael G Maxfield. Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications, 1981. Pp. 280. $25.00 cloth, $12.50 paper.
Since the mid 1970's there has been growing research interest in fear
of crime and behavioral reactions. Most of this research has focused on
individuals using sample survey data. Although it relies heavily on survey data, Coping Wih Crime is noteworthy for its integration of field research, content analysis of newspapers, and a secondary analysis of the
national victimization surveys to present a wealth of fresh insights on
neighborhood as well as individual responses to crime. This book is one
of a number of studies derived from Northwestern's Reactions to Crime
Project, which examined individual and collective responses to crime in
three cities, Philadelphia, Chicago, and San Francisco, and ten neighborhoods spread across these cities. Researchers conducted city-wide
and neighborhood random digit dialed telephone surveys and year-long
neighborhood field investigation.
Skogan and Maxfield cover ground which others have been overhow individuals fear crime and how they take behavioral measures to
cope with it-but their analysis on many points is more detailed and
more insightful than that of those who have preceded them. They are
most concerned with fear of crime, its nature, its causes, and its impact.
Their overriding message is that there is much more fear than actual victimization; that fear cannot simply be explained by crime rates
or individual victimization experiences; and that fear is related to some,
but not all, types of behaviors people undertake to deal with crime.
Fear is linked to vicarious experiences and neighborhood contexts.
They limit their discussion of fear to feelings of being unsafe in
neighborhood streets. This is by no means the only form of crime fear,
but, the authors argue, it is the most pervasive and the one most related
to neighborhood conditions.
It is often reported that the media distort the picture of crime by
giving greater emphasis to personal crimes, particularly those of an unusual or gruesome kind. The authors find that interpersonal communica-
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tion about crime has a similar tendency to report disproportionately
personal crimes. Indeed, the content of interpersonal communications
appears to be more consequential than the mass media. The media provides crime information which is more abstract and less directly relevant
to the receivers and has no systematic effect on crime perceptions. By
contrast, when people learn about crime, especially crime in their own
neighborhoods, from their personal communication networks, it is much
more likely to affect their perceptions and behavioral precautions.
Victimization does have some effect on fear, but most fearful people
were not recent victims. As expected, personal crimes have more of an
impact on the individual than property crime. Skogan and Maxfield
point out, however, that since many more people are victims of burglary
than of personal crime, property crime may contribute more to people's
fears and perceptions of neighborhood crime problems than personal
victimization.
Ever since victim surveys began providing estimates of victimization rates for different demographic categories, researchers have wrestled with the counterintuitive finding that less victimized categoriesfemales and older adults-are more fearful. Skogan and Maxfield argue
that a sense of physical vulnerability shared by women and older persons explains their greater fear of crime. Physical vulnerability includes
feelings of an inability to resist victimization and of a greater likelihood
of suffering consequences. By contrast, the idea of social vulnerabilitythe degree to which people are exposed to more crime because they live
in high crime areas-is used to explain the higher levels of fear among
blacks and poor people. These two types of vulnerability are additive,
with sex and race being more powerful predictors of fear than age and
income.
This study also explores crime perceptions at neighborhood and citywide levels. The size of a city is substantially correlated with the fear
levels of its residents. Larger cities, regardless of their crime rates, tend
to have higher levels of fear than smaller cities. There is, however, more
variation among a city's neighborhoods than among cities in levels of
crime and fear.
The study makes more of a contribution to the study of fear and
other crime perceptions than to behavioral reactions. The general pattern of findings, that personal precautions are linked to perceived individual vulnerability while household protective measures beyond the
most simple or routine ones are more associated with higher incomes
and higher social integration, confirms earlier studies. What is less often
included in other studies of behavioral reactions to crime is an analysis
of those who move out of urban neighborhoods. Using survey data from
the Chicago metropolitan area, the authors examine the reasons given
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by those who have left the city for the suburbs. White flight is found to
have much less to do with problems such as crime in the neighborhood
of origin than with the opportunities and attractions of the neighborhood of destination. While crime may be a factor in some moves from
the city, it is not a major one.
Although the authors demonstrate a high degree of sensitivity to
the general quality and limits of their data, there are a few occasions on
which their conceptualization of the data may be misleading. Perhaps
the most important has to do with the relationship between victimization, fear, and behavioral responses. Like almost all other victimization
surveys, the one used here asked respondents about victimization experiences which occurred in a limited recall period. When these data are
analyzed, any respondent who did not report a victimization is considered a "non-victim." It is obvious, however, that some respondents who
were not victims in the past year or two could have been previously
victimized. If the crimes were salient, then it is probable that they affected the respondent's perceptions and behaviors at the time of the interview. When such persons are labeled "non-victim" one is not
surprised that this study and others using similar data find small or no
differences between victims and "non-victims." Skogan and Maxfield
take some account of this problem by speaking of "recent" victims, but
at other times they draw conclusions about the small effects of victimization experiences in general.
It has only been possible to highlight a few of the great number of
important findings in this study, which is probably the most complete
research report on these topics to be found in the social science literature. One of its important policy implications is its support for focusing
"on the dynamics of fear as a distinct object of policy analysis." Fear
may prove more tractable than crime rates. Its reduction can make a
contribution to neighborhood improvement through individual and collective crime protection and prevention activities.
FRED DUBOW
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO
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CRIME CONTROL STRATEGIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF

By Harold E. Pepinsky.
Press, 1980. Pp. 352. $10.95.
CRIME.

New York: Oxford University

Many introductory texts exist in criminology; few, however, are organized to promote critical thought. In criminology, we too often fail to
ask the appropriate questions. Simple questions often lead to superficial
answers in our attempts in devising strategies to reduce crime. Students
entering the field of criminology and criminal justice are often assigned
texts that simply present a cross section of the field with descriptive
chapters that are top heavy with definitions, concepts, and perspectives,
leaving the reader with the task of memorizing (ad nauseum) for exams
that often simply require regurgitation (ad infinitum).
Pepinsky's approach is an admirable one which provides both the
neophyte and the scholar with intellectual tools for analyzing complex
problems in crime control strategies. At the outset, he rejects a "value
neutral" position (at vii) which promotes the study of the causes of
crime for its intrinsic value. Rather, Crime Control Strategies organizes
ideas in terms of their "usefulness" in developing more adequate crime
control strategies. Pepinsky points out that authors should "push [students] to develop their own opinions" (at 65), that "the reader is qualified to create and evaluate strategies of crime control" (at 68), that the
reader is invited to "disagree [with him] . . . as an exercise in indepen-

dence from the 'expert' criminologist" (at 190), that those beginning the
study of crime have, as their greatest weapon, their imagination ("we
need approaches to crime control that have not yet been tried and evaluated," at 279), and, finally, that criminology is an open field that
gives many a chance to do pioneering work of social importance (at
309).
Throughout the book, Pepinsky deliberately minimizes the use of
esoteric language, something we all fall victims to in our attempts to
understand and communicate. Yet, to Pepinsky's credit, he is able to
present complex issues and questions which challenge the reader to test
assumptions, premises, as well as his or her imagination in developing
creative crime control strategies. The neophyte in criminology will receive sophisticated tools for critical thought, while the sophisticated student certainly will feel the need to rethink the crime problem and
existing crime control strategies.
The organization of the book focuses on two important themes:
(1) the question of what it is we wish to control, i.e., measures of crime,
measures of criminality, or costs and benefits; and (2) the question of by
what criteria can control strategies be evaluated. Addressing these questions in parts two and three of his book, Pepinsky discusses the dilem-
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mas, contradictions, and pitfalls in our attempts to control rates of crime
and criminality.
He discusses conviction rates, police-produced crime rates, victimization rates, incarceration rates, self-report rates, and recidivism rates.
Each, he points out, can be evaluated along seven dimensions: (1) measuring rate numerators, i.e., the number of crimes reported; (2) measuring rate denominators, i.e., the population at risk; (3) current trends of
crime and crime control in the United States, controlling for different
types of rates; (4) evaluating chances of controlling the respectively derived rates, focusing particularly on the possibilities of type 1 (false positive) and type 2 (false negative) errors, the former being those errors
attributed to overprediction, the latter to underprediction; (5) side effects, particularly unintended consequences; (6) political considerations,
i.e., forces that promote or hinder specific crime control strategies; and
(7) ethical issues, focusing particularly on "value neutrality," just
deserts, "objectivity," hidden assumptions and premises that guide planners' strategies, and questions such as whether it is worse to convict people unnecessarily (type one treatment error) or to let guilty people go
free.

In part four, Pepinsky addresses the issue of cost-benefit analysis, a
field recently opened wide by economists. He discusses some important
recent research that attempts to operationalize costs and benefits in specific strategies of crime control. Again, he points out limitations as well
as hidden assumptions that exist in these models. Finally, in the last
section of part four, Pepinsky spells out the necessity of a "systems approach." "In criminology, the traditionalist seeks to find out what
causes crime; the systems analyst looks at how probabilities of crime, or
responses to crime, might be changed in a society by intervening at various points in the crime production process" (at 301).
At the end of each chapter a section is devoted to "food for
thought" wherein several think-questions are posed that encourage the
reader to examine his or her assumptions and to think through alternative, imaginative crime control strategies. In sum, Pepinsky's Ci'me ControlStrateqiesis a challenging book that encourages creative thinking and
encourages neophytes as well as the well-read to enjoy the process of
creative, imaginative thought in developing crime control strategies.
This is something few if any texts do.
DRAGAN MILOVANOVIC
DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
LONG ISLAND UNIVERSITY,

C.W. POST CENTER

1322

BOOK REVIEWS

[Vol. 73

THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SO-

By FrancisA. Allen. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1981 Pp. 160. $15.00.
CIAL PURPOSE.

Doubt and even despair over the prospects of reforming offenders
are now familiar themes in the literature. Nobody, however, has analyzed the slide away from rehabilitation as fully and sensitively as Francis Allen in his new book, which constitutes a more complete version of
the Storrs Lectures given at Yale Law School in 1979.
The first great prisons of the nineteenth century-Auburn and Sing
Sing in New York, the Eastern State Penitentiary in Philadelphia, and
Millbank in London-were based on the belief in regeneration through
a regime of solitude, work, and what was expected to be a cleansing
introspection. After the Civil War, Elmira in New York was built and
became another great monument to all that is conjured up in those sombre yet hopeful titles "penitentiary" and "reformatory." It seems that
those on the firing line, the wardens and warders engaged in the day to
day management of prisoners, were from the start less confident of the
success of reformation.' Yet the ideology of rehabilitation persisted with
astonishing strength into the mid-twentieth century, even in the face of
little evidence of practical success.
Rehabilitiation theory was in large part responsible for the American invention of the indeterminate sentence and for the colossal power
conferred upon parole boards. Since the time required to rehabilitate
an offender was unpredictable, rather than make this decision irrationally at the time of disposition the logical alternative was to entrust the
question for continuing review by those who might release the prisoner
when they saw signs of reform in his record and demeanor. In the face
of little confirmatory evidence, the academic community retained an almost touching fidelity to this model of rehabilitative justification for indeterminate imprisonment right into the 1970s. But when the
defections came, they were sudden and massive.
Three factors contributed to these defections. First, it became less
and less possible to ignore the fact that rehabilitation did not work very
well. Crime, especially violent crime, increased at a disturbing rate after
19602 and recidivism among violent offenders remained high. In addition, many "rehabilitative" practices came under careful scrutiny and
were judged to be unconvincing euphemisms for vengeful punishment
or simple restraint. Finally, the moral roots of rehabilitation theory
1 M. SHERMAN & G. HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 89-90 (1981).
2 See Gurr, Historical Trends in Violent Crimes: A CriticalReview ofthe Evidence in 3 CRIME
AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 295 (M. Tonry & N. Morris eds. 1981).
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were themselves challenged. Penal philosophers argued that society
may have warrant to lock someone up for reasons of retribution or even
simply to protect others, but that there is no justification for locking
people up until they become better people. 3 The advocates of rehabilitation reeled under this triple assault of meager success, critical analysis,
and philosophical doubt.
Allen elegantly advances the larger underlying social and cultural
explanations for the flight from rehabilitation. He argues convincingly
that confidence in the possibility of rehabilitation depends on a high
degree of general confidence in society about established values. It was
for this reason that a philosophy of incarceration in rehabilitative terms
naturally arose and flourished in the Victorian era. Twentieth century
doubt has eroded this confidence; human nature now seems less susceptible to improvement and we are more likely to think that we are sliding
down the road to perdition than marching along the road to perfection.
The very ideal of progress is viewed with suspicion as we see the unexpected destruction worked by many of the technological developments
hailed by the Victorians.
Rehabilitation also rests on a positive feeling about fundamental
social institutions and their capacity to do good. Education and the
home environment were until recently the cornerstones of Anglo-American society. Society viewed these institutions as beneficent and as capable of strengthening the good and working miracles with the weak, slow,
or evilly inclined. But the family is now devalued as an institution, even
deprecated by some, while schools are regarded by many with contempt
if not outright condemnation. They may be perceived as not only inefficient and incompetent but even in some respects as playing a sinister
role as the props of an unjust and intolerable system.
A general scepticism about middle class morality parallels this cynicism about institutional arrangements. Radicals, minorities, and the
poor may perceive Establishment morals as a hypocritical facade that
cloaks the dominance of one class in America. Furthermore, the radicalization of a section of the middle class and its experimentation with a
diversity of life styles increasingly dilutes the consensus of an earlier
time, leaving traditional values securely held only in the shrinking fortresses of middle-America.
Allen points out that along with a confidently held set of values
there is a further condition for adherence to the ideal of rehabilitation.
This is a belief in the malleability of people- a belief which has hardly
3 Two especially influential publications urging these positions were AMERICAN FRIENDS
SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971) and A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE:
THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976).
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deserted us. Indeed, popular belief in the possibility of brainwashing
and the widespread allegiance to the desirability of psychotherapy to
alleviate many of the problems of life have probably led to a widely
diffused conviction that the application of medical or other conditioning
techniques can significantly change most people.
As Allen demonstrates, however, there are important shifts in our
present posture towards such therapy compared with the attitudes of an
earlier time. The aspect of therapy that seems to account for its present
mass appeal is its promise of relief from guilt and anxiety. How different from the Victorian aims of inculcating guilt, of reminding us of our
obligations, of instilling an awful sense of duty and the need to do right
and refrain from wrong! Modern therapy in its attractive guise is seen
as liberating and fulfilling, as affording an escape from irrational constraints and strictures. Present perceptions do not fit the ideal of a therapy that rehabilitates from crime and restores one to dutiful living.
Many are likely to see the rehabilitative approach as at best a manipulative and paternalistic effort by the Establishment to perpetuate its
power by guiding errant citizens back to fulfill their approved roles.
In a darker view, therefore, therapy has become identified with savage, mind-changing intervention or with hypocritical euphemisms for
punishment. Allen cites instances, for example, where a solitary confinement cell (mockingly or half seriously) is referred to as the "quiet room"
and the use of cattle prods is called "aversion therapy." In these perversions, "therapy" is connected with the use of psychiatry as an arm of the
state police in such countries as the Soviet Union, and rehabilitation
becomes tainted with the image of the desperate recantations and'confessions pursued throughout history by such terrible institutions as the
Holy Office of the Spanish Inquisition and the Gestapo.
As if rehabilitation theory were not sufficiently assailed by radical
thought, which has detected these elements of tyranny in rehabilitative
practice, it has also reeled under a furious onslaught from law-and-order
advocates. Desperate to locate plausible culprits for the increase in violent crime, conservative critics have accused judges, criminal justice officials, and criminologists of being too concerned with nurturing the
reformation of the criminal and too insensitive to the wrong done to the
victim.
Thus, a curious philosophical alliance sprang up in the 1970s between liberal theorists and populist law-and-order advocates. Disgusted
with rehabilitation for very different reasons, they combined in an attack on the indeterminate sentence and the discretion of the parole
board. According to the liberals, indeterminate sentences were wrong
because they resulted in gross inequality, in chilling uncertainty for prisoners, and in arbitrary power often unintelligently exercised by parole
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boards. According to conservatives, indeterminate sentences were
wrong because they resulted in early releases by soft-hearted parole officials, deceived by devious prisoners who had learned well the lessons
taught in prison "acting schools." As a substitute theory, the concept of
retribution was hauled out of the back room to which it had so long
been consigned, and after a quick paint job was presented to the public
under its new title, "desert."
In place of indeterminate sentences, both factions agreed that we
must have punishments that fit the crime. Price tags of a certain precision should be annexed to crimes or to particular ways of committing
crimes and the court should have only a narrow band of discretion in
sentencing. In this way criminals will be spared the uncertainty of not
knowing how long they will have to spend in jail, and the public will be
reassured that offenders cannot escape the punishment that they
deserve.

4

This reemergence of the desert principle has hardly provided any
answers for the practical problems of penologists. One problem is that
desert, while it highlights the need for equality and fairness in sentencing, reveals little or nothing about the general scale on which sentences
should be fixed. One desert adherent might judge that a certain kind of
assault merits two years in prison, while another would rate the identical
offense as a twenty-year crime. This ambiguity was of course what
made possible the alliance of the crime fighters and the justice seekers.
Liberal opponents of the vagueness and indeterminancy of earlier sentencing practices for the most part contemplated determinate sentences
of a moderate or light range with perhaps no imprisonment at all for
many offenses. Their conservative allies, on the other hand, envisaged
desert sentences on a much more severe level. After all, some people still
think of the cat-o'-nine-tails as a prisoner's desert and, as Allen points
out, it was also once considered to be powerfully rehabilitative.
An awareness that desert, for all its philosophical interest, hardly
provides a very practical guide for the details of a sentencing practice, as
well as an understandable wish to offer some solace to an uneasy public,
have recently led some criminologists to emphasize the importance of
incapacitation as a justification for imprisonment. 5 Whatever else is in
doubt, we are told, we do at least know that offenders cannot hurt the
4 On the recent trend in some jurisdictions to introduce schemes of determinate sentencing, see Zimring, Making the Punihment Fit the Cn'me, HASTINGS CENTER REP. (1976); PROCEEDINGS OF THE SPECIAL CONFERENCE ON DETERMINATE SENTENCING, DETERMINATE

SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? (1978); von Hirsch & Hanrahan,
Systems in America: An Overview, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 289 (1981).

DeterminatePenalty

5 See M. SHERMAN & G. HAWKINS, supra note 1; Floud & Young, Dangerousnessand Crimina/Justice, in CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN CRIMINOLOGY XLVII (1981).
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public when they are locked up. And if prisons are overcrowded and are
a scarce resource, then prudence dictates that we concentrate on identifying and locking up offenders who have demonstrated that they pose a
6
substantial risk of committing future violent acts.
Incapacitation in its "strong" form of long sentences based chiefly
on estimates of future danger is a morally unsound thesis, since psychiatrists and criminologists concur in proclaiming their inability to identify
long-term dangerousness. False positive predictions of future dangerousness are likely to be very high, and sensitive advocates of long-term preventive or protective detention are driven to subtle, if not tortured
ethical defenses of their position. One such argument contends that although we have no right to lock up those who have not committed any
crime just because we think they are dangerous, once we acquire the
right to punish a person because he has committed a crime, we also acquire a supplementary right to confine that person for a longer period
based on a concededly unreliable estimate of future dangerousness.
Floud and Young justified this position in a recent work by drawing an
analogy to the self-defense privilege: the violent offender has revealed
himself as an assailant and we may protect ourselves out of a right of
7
preservation independent of the practice of punishment.
The weakness of this argument is that self-defense theory applies to
a situation in which there is a reasonable response in an emergency to an
individual who either is or reasonably appears to be immediately threatening the victim with deadly force. With long-term confinement, however, we make a judgment about an individual with due deliberation
and not under the presssure of an immediate crisis. It is a judgment
which, in terms of our knowledge of the inaccuracy of prediction, is not
only likely to be wrong, but also becomes progressively more likely to be
wrong the longer it extends in the future.
The weaker form of incapacitation theory, which merely emphasizes the need to treat those who have committed violent crimes in a
moderately severe way and also to treat them in a consistent and uniform fashion, is a much more acceptable argument. 8 But it seems fairly
clear that whether in the strong or the weak form, incapacitation will be
in the forefront of criminological discussion for some time to come. It is
therefore crucial to consider its relation to the apparently displaced justification of rehabilitation.
Incapacitation and rehabilitation have one important feature in
6 The most penetrating recent study of the calculus of interests and policies contained in
the problem of overcrowding is M. SHERMAN & G. HAWKINS, supra note 1.
7 Floud & Young, supra note 5, at 38-49.
8 This is the form of the theory presented by M. SHERMAN AND G. HAWKINS, supra note
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common: neither can be regarded as a philosophy of punishment. If the
concept of punishment essentially entails the notion of an unpleasant
consequence ensuing upon the breaking of a rule, so that the consequence is perceived as being deserved for this reason, then rehabilitation
as a paramount ideal would sometimes be incompatible with punishment, for it may often be the case that rehabilitation can only be effected by an absence of sanctions. Similarly, if incapacitation is the
paramount goal it would have to override the model of punishment in
some cases, for the master ideal of punishment could not condone incarceration for any period longer than that which is a just response to the
act done by the defendant. If, on the other hand, punishment is the
paramount aim, rehabilitation would have to be a subordinate goal that
could be pursued only in so far as the aims of punishment allowed.
Thus, as many scholars have pointed out, punishment simply cannot be fully elucidated in terms of either rehabilitation or incapacitation. 9 Incapacitation could of course be proffered as the chief
justification for incarceration, but to accept it as such would be an abandonment of the core concept of punishment, which demands that the
response be limited by the notion of just desert. Like rehabilitation, incapacitation can be reconciled with the concept of punishment only if it
is assigned a subordinate status and perceived as no more than a useful
by-product or bonus that cannot be allowed to overrun the limits of a
desert-defined response. Recent attempts to present incapacitation as a
prime justification of imprisonment are potentially dangerous if they fail
to clarify this reservation.
As Allen acknowledges, the academic ferment in recent years over
the justification for imprisonment clearly stems from anxiety about rising crime and prison overcrowding and from an understandable desire
to be seen to be making a practical response to popular clamor. The
greatest merit of his book is its insistence in the last section that, even if
it is true that we were long deceived in our hopes for rehabilitation,
there are independent reasons why we must continue to offer voluntary
facilities and programs that may hold out hope for rehabilitation.
There is no empirical evidence to support the proposition that rehabilitation never works, and it would defy common sense to so imagine. It is
virtually impossible to conduct any studies that would quantify the success or failure of rehabilitative efforts; to do so would require the ascription of definite reasons to cases where the offender does not commit
further crimes or does not commit crimes of a like kind or gravity. Such
non-recidivism may sometimes be due to the passage of time; sometimes
it may be because the grim impact of prison has been an effective spe9 See, e.g., H.L.A.

HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY

(1968).
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cific deterrent for the individual; sometimes it may be because some educative or otherwise rehabilitative program has changed the offender
and better fitted him for social life. Although we can never know why a
particular individual does not commit more crimes, we do know that
many offenders do not commit further crimes after release. It is a reasonable hypothesis that in some cases rehabilitative programs have
played some useful part. This hypothesis presents a utilitarian justification for continuing such programs and trying to expand and improve
them.
The utilitarian argument is reinforced by a most important moral
contention. The moral demand that prisoners be treated as persons requires that, whether imprisonment be justified in terms of desert, general deterrence, or incapacitation, we should make every reasonable
effort to make it a humane and helpful experience. This is an obvious
conclusion if we rely on incapacitation or deterrence as our chief justification for imprisonment, since these validations frankly admit that the
prisoner is being confined for the benefit of others. Initially, the desert
principle might seem to lead us away from this obligation since its advocates could deploy it to argue that the prisoner deserves to suffer. If
punishment means an unpleasant consequence, then it is a waste of resources to leaven prisons with rehabilitative efforts. Under a retributive
regime, punishment should be nasty and brutish so as to hurt as much as
possible. One response to this argument is the utilitarian point that we
can better protect society by using prison time to make it likely that
some prisoners on release will become useful (or at least harmless) members of the community.
There is a more specific moral reason why we have a duty to make
rehabilitative programs available. If offenders deserve to be punished,
then people generally deserve to be given the best opportunities to
choose not to become offenders. One need not adopt a determinist view
of crime causation to acknowledge that many people who commit serious crimes have more difficulty than others in choosing not to commit
crimes because of social conditions that are not their fault. This does
not mean that offenders ought not to be punished, but under general
principles of fairness it does point to an obligation to work to change
social conditions. Generally, this need for change involves the whole
range of social conditions that contribute to criminality. This is a daunting task and Allen properly observes that a general exhortation to social
improvement does not constitute a penal policy. But within the penal
system itself, we have a particular chance to make some small discharge
of this obligation through the provision of rehabilitative programs. Persistent efforts in this direction are required by general principles of justice and fairness.
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Professor Allen has written a fine book, bringing a wealth of social
and cultural knowledge and sensibility to the questions of penology. If
his book is in some measure an elegy for the imperial era of rehabilitation, at the same time it bravely insists upon the need to remain committed to the noble aims of the tradition of rehabilitative thought in
criminology.
GRAHAM HUGHES
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

By Doreenj.McBamet. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey:
Humanities Press, 1981. Pp. 182. $30.00.

CONVICTION.

Doreen McBarnet is a keen observer of the courtroom and the role
of law in structuring courtroom interaction. She is a lively and important writer and a critical legal theorist who, even when she provokes
disagreement, also provokes thinking in new directions. Her new book
sets itself the task of trying to explain "how it is legally possible for the
prosecution to win so routinely despite the rhetoric of the criminal justice system bending over backwards to constrain the prosecution and
safeguard the accused." McBarnet's answer in a nutshell is that the due
process safeguards provided by law are merely rhetorical, rather than
realistic. Moreover, the rhetoric serves the powerful by affirming an ideology of individual freedom, while masking the considerable procedural
advantages accruing to police and prosecutor.
McBarnet's argument is methodological as well as substantive. Instead of focusing on interactions between police and citizen, lawyer and
client, magistrate and defendant, she tries to understand how the formal
rules of law themselves permit what occurs in the system to happen. By
turning "the law" from a background assumption into a primary focus,
she tries to show how both substantive and procedural law is constructed and deconstructed.
Agreement with McBarnet's substantive answer to her main question depends on the assumptions one makes. McBarnet summarizes her
critique of the "gap between the rhetoric of justice and the substance
and structure of law" by declaring that there is a false distinction between Packer's' due process and crime control models. She writes:
The law on criminal procedure in its current form does not so much
set a standard of legality from which the police deviate as provide a license
to ignore it. If we bring due process down from the dizzy heights of abI H.

PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION

(1968).
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scrutiny, the conclusion must be that
straction and subject it to empirical
2
due process isfor crime control.
McBarnet is a forceful writer. Yet her analysis satisfies only if one takes
due process rhetoric not only seriously but also lieral'y. That is, to agree
with her one seems to have to believe either that because every defendant is presumed innocent, the vast majority are factually innocent, or
that, even if a vast majority are factually guilty, the presumption of innocence and other due process rights should exonerate a substantial percentage of them.
After reading McBarnet, I went back to Packer and reviewed his
discussion of the due process and crime control models. His introductory
discussion cautions against believing that the "presumption of innocence" is intended to create a presumption of factual innocence. Packer
offers the example of a murderer who chooses to shoot his victim in plain
view of a number of people. There are eyewitnesses to the shooting and
there is no doubt that the accused is factually guilty. He is, however,
legally still presumed to be innocent. It would, as Packer says,
be plainly absurd to maintain that more probably than not the suspect did
not commit the killing. But that is not what presumption of innocense
means. It means that until there has been an adjudication of guilt by an
authority legally competent to make such an adjudication, the suspect is to
be treated, for reasons that have nothing whatever to do with the probable
outcome of the case, as if his guilt is an open question. 3
The most sustaining idea behind the due process ideal is the doctrine of legalguilt. Legal guilt implies that a defendant should not be
held guilty of a crime merely because the state can show that in all
probability, based upon reliable evidence, the accused actually did what
he is said to have done. Due process-legal guilt-requires that certain
forms be observed. For example, did the statute of limitations run, has
the accused been previously convicted or acquitted of the same or a substantially similar offense or can the state bear the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt? All of these issues obviously invite
interpretation in any given case. Sometimes an accused can successfully
assert defenses that have nothing to do with factual guilt.
McBarnet's interpretation of due process as rhetoric makes sense
insofar as a literal interpretation of legalese misleads the average citizen
and even the better than average sociologist. But when due process is
understood as a set of directions to officials on how they must proceed in
order to sustain a finding of legal guilt, it is not puzzling that most of
those accused of crimes should be found guilty. Most persons who show
up in court accused of crimes are factually guilty.
2 D. McBARNET, CONVICTION 156 (1981).

3 H. PACKER, supra note 1, at 161.
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McBarnet is in any case not writing her book about defendants accused of seiious crimes. Hers is a study of 105 cases in Scotland, where
police are offered by law a degree of discretionary authority they do not
enjoy in the United States. For example, a defendant in Scotland may
be arrested as "a known thief in suspicious circumstances." Such lowlevel defendants really depend for their fate upon the good- or ill- will of
the police as do those arrested for loitering or breach of the peace.
McBarnet urges the reader not to observe the interaction between the
police and the accused, but to set sights upon the law itself which permits the police such wide discretion as the focus of problem. Of course,
any number of previous writers have observed that procedural injustices
are often traceable to inadequacies of substantive law. Indeed, that concept might properly be considered the main theme of the Packer work of
which McBarnet is so critical. It is, after all, titled The Limits ofthe Criminal Sanction. Even Sir Robert Peel was profoundly aware of the relation
between the substance of criminal prohibitions and how police actually
conduct themselves. Indeed, he undertook to reform the criminal law
before reforming the police. In short, the idea that substantive law influences procedure is no doubt true, but it is scarcely newsworthy.
McBarnet is also right but unsurprising when she alleges that due
process is for crime control, as Packer's illustration of the factually guilty
murderer suggests. Packer would not find that noteworthy, nor do I
since one of the goals of substantive criminal law is to control crime. I
have never thought that due process requirements really posed very serious impediments to the process of conviction. Most defendants that are
factually guilty are convicted, provided the authorities adhere to elementary procedural rules. The authorities are rarely, as some of them
claim, hamstrung. But they are directed and overseen much more than
they would be, I suspect, if a presumption of guilt as a form of crime
control was lega4'y permissible.
Although McBarnet never considers what life would be like without due process, she implies that nothing or little would change. She
calls due process law a "facade of civil rights ideology," as "elusive and
adaptable as a chameleon," and "simply withered away by exceptions,
provisos, qualifications." But then McBarnet backtracks by saying that
due process erosion occurs principally in "petty offenses, particularly offenses against public order." She argues that these "dominate" the work
of the police and the courts, an impression one might have if one studied
only a lower court, as she did. The word "dominate" is in any case
ambiguous. Public drunkenness is our most "dominant" crime from a
narrow statistical viewpoint, but surely one would not argue that it is
our most serious crime.
Some of McBarnet's arguments might be more applicable to Eng-
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land and Scotland than to the United States. She complains, for example, that the rhetoric of justice requires incriminating evidence as the
basis for arrest and search, while the law allows arrest and search in
order to develop incriminating evidence. Legally this is not the case in
the United States, although it does happen. Before Mapp v. Ohio,4 New
York police used to testify on a routine basis that the narcotics they
seized had been "hidden on the person." Under New York law, such
illegally seized evidence was admissible, since New York state did not
subscribe to the exclusionary rule. After Mapp, the law changed and the
exclusionary rule was extended to the states. New York police then routinely testified that the seized narcotics had been dropped or thrown to
the ground. The perjured police testimony came to be known in the
system as "dropsy" testimony. This, of course, is an instance where the
"law" offered protections that were undermined by the process of "the
law in action." McBarnet argues that sociologists have been misled by
observing the law in action. The reality is, of course, that it is useful to
study law in action as well as law construction. They are after all
inseparable.
McBarnet's position is perhaps best exemplified in the United
States law regarding police interogation. We are all familiar with the
holding in Mirandav. Arizona,5 that an arrested person must be informed

of the right to remain silent, the right to an attorney, and the right to be
provided with an attorney if he or she cannot afford one. If an accused
confesses, the government has a "heavy burden" to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the waiver was made voluntarily, intelligently, and
knowingly. Following Miranda, studies showed that when the warnings
were conveyed by police so as to minimize their significance defendants
frequently waived their rights and confessed. 6 One might argue that the
courts permitted the police to confuse legally incompetent defendants,
that knowledgeable and intelligent defendants did not waive their
rights. Logically, Miranda and later cases should have held that a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver cannot be made without the advice of an attorney.
McBarnet thus is partially right. The courts can erode due process
rights while they appear to be giving them. Even if a sizeable proportion of defendants waive their rights, it would be an overstatement to
assert that due process protections are entirely eroded in the confessions
area. When a defendant does request an attorney, the police can no
4 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 Ayres, Confessions and the Court, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Dec. 1968, at 18-20; Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42 (1968); Project, Interrogationsin
New Haven; The Impact of Miranaa, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967).
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longer engage the defendant in conversation. In sum, there is something
to McBarnet's position, but her sweeping generalizations about the erosion of due process do not seem to be justified.
I analyze the problem of due process and conviction rather differently than McBarnet does. Given that both English and American societies, however arguably class structured, racist, and unfair they may be,
engender serious crime by a minority of criminals against a majority of
citizens, the question we need to ask is: how is it possible to sustain
ideals of legality and due process so that citizens can continue to make
civil libertarian claims? The idea of due process is fundamentally
counter-intuitive. Why, after all, should a defendant, arrested by a policeman with probable cause, even be presumed to be innocent? The
presumption of innocence i¢mystifying in two senses: first, that such a
presumption should exist in the face of all probability; and second, that
it does indeed confuse those who interpret it literally.
In a contemporary society with increasing fear of crime, due process
is thus continually under attack. It is difficult to sustain public confidence in a criminal justice system that openly suppresses illegally obtained factual evidence-for example, confessions to rape or
kidnapping. (Recall that Miranda confessed to having kidnapped and
forcibly raped a nineteen-year-old.) Courts suppress that evidence in
the name of protecting the innocent. But when we convict innocent
defendants, as we sometimes do, we do not know and therefore we do
not announce that they are innocent. If due process protections freed substantially more factually known guilty persons than they already do,
such protections would surely engerlder even greater criticism.
Nor is the law as elusive (at least in the United States) as McBarnet
perceives it to be. To the extent that the privilege against self-incrimination does not operate in practice, it is not because the law is particularly unclear, but because police practices may undermine it. The
privilege against self-incrimination may be undermined, while the defendant is in custody, by the policeman's demeanor in advising the suspect of his constitutional rights, or, in the courtroom, by the policeman's
perjured testimony regarding voluntary waiver. But in these instances
the law is perfectly clear.
Even in the search and seizure area, where the law is truly muddled
and confusing at the edges, police frequently encounter situations where
the law is reasonably clear. Indeed, as indicated'earlier, police may be
motivated to perjure themselves so that thefactua/y guilty will lose the
protection of clear procedural rights.
McBarnet argues further that it is unfair that guilty pleas account
for something more than ninety percent of convictions. There are many
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criticisms to be made of plea bargaining, but it is unlikely that if plea
bargaining were eliminated there would be fewer convictions. Jury trials are no more likely to exculpate the factually guilty than are negotiated settlements. Plea bargaining has been banned in Alaska since
1975. 7 The Alaska experience has shown that overall conviction rates do
not change significantly, although prosecutors win a larger proportion of
those cases that actually go to trial. Futhermore, sentences are more
severe for those who are charged with relatively less serious offenses, precisely the sort of defendant whom McBarnet studied, and for whom
McBarnet advocates more jury trials. In fact, at present, plea bargaining is more likely to be criticized by hard liners who think it permits
serious criminals to negotiate light sentences, than by due process advocates who argue that defendants are undermined by it.
But McBarnet is actually making a more comprehensive argument.
The law is ultimately interpreted by her as an ideological tool for protecting the interests of the powerful. Citing Marx and Engels, she argues
that the study of forms of law
may help us understand not only how the legal system can simultaneously
maintain both due process and crime control, the prime concern of this
study, but more broadly, how it can reproduce the ideology ofjustice while
denying it, and how the state through law can give class-based ideas "the
form of universality."8
The law is for her an unfair, class-based instrument of social control,
made even more mystifying and devious by its references to ideals of
legality. These ideals, she argues, are routinely subverted in practice by
high court judges and, finally even she acknowledges, by its practitioners
as well. I certainly agree that procedural rights are fragile and counterintuitive enough to be subverted by legal practitioners whether they be
called police, judges, or lawyers.
I also acknowledge that the law is complex, but it surely is not what
she asserts it to be: "a will-o'-the-wisp, pausing but a moment before the
next decision, and then only 'clear' for the particular circumstances of
that particular case." McBarnet is a powerful writer, a forceful rhetori7 A. Gross, Alaska Attorney General's Office, Memorandum on Plea Bargaining to All
District Attorneys (1975).
8 D. McBARNET, supra note 1, at 166-67.
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cian. Unfortunately, she is writing about a complex process which may
be more obscured than illuminated by colorful rhetoric.
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